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Abstract 
Ethiopia has for a long time been one of the world’s most food-insecure countries. Efforts by the 
government and a multitude of sponsors including NGOs have developed an array of institutions 
and instruments to mitigate the negative impact of production and supply disruptions. Public 
stockpiles are one such tool, the use of which is rapidly increasing worldwide. This brief field 
study examines the Ethiopian policies and practice in context, including various instruments 
operated by farmers, processors and traders. 
The study finds that the multiple objectives assigned to food reserves as well as the present 
management structure may not be well-suited at a time of high world market prices and when 
international food aid is dwindling, and as the international regulatory trade and investment 
environment remains a matter of unfinished business from a global food security perspective. A 
comprehensive study of various options for improvements would lay out policy alternatives for 
public authorities and stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction* 
This study is based on a short field research on Ethiopian food security, in particular on the food re-
serve schemes and various stakeholders involved therein (Government e.g. Agricultural Transfor-
mation Agency, regional and international organisations e.g. UNECA and WFP, producers, proces-
sors, traders, universities, the commodity exchange ECX, insurance companies, Oxfam America and 
other NGOs). It first recalls the main food security policy instruments (2) and summarises a few initia-
tives undertaken at the regional level (3). It then reviews the food security policies in Ethiopia, as I 
have understood them in the short time available, by describing six measures relating to food security 
in general (4a) and by analysing in more detail the official food reserve strategy (4b). The study con-
cludes with a proposal to analyse further improvement possibilities in the Ethiopian system of food 
reserves and on how to make food reserves less costly without losing their efficiency as a quick and 
focused food disbursal system (5). 
2. Food Security as a set of policies addressing food production and trade 
Before discussing food security instruments, it is perhaps useful to recall Nobel Prize winner Amartya 
Sen’s findings that endemic hunger is not a problem of supply but of distribution, and which can be 
solved by an entitlement approach (Sen, 2009).1 It should also be noted that “food security” has dif-
ferent meanings at the international, national and household levels. 
Just by considering the many policy tools which directly or indirectly impact on food security, one is 
reminded of the complexity of the challenge facing especially a poor net food-importing country like 
Ethiopia. Indeed, each of the following instruments can both increase and decrease national food secu-
rity, depending on the way they are handled, financed, and harmonised: 
 Agricultural and food production: research & development/extension, vocational and man-
agement training, investment and production finance/credits, insurance schemes for produc-
tion, commercial and investment risks, input subsidies, (small) farmer support, land use legis-
lation and administrative practice, and infrastructure support. 
 Social policies like (staple) food price guarantees and food aid in various forms. 
 Trade instruments such as tariffs, safeguards, quotas, market interventions, price risk insur-
ance, commodity exchanges, futures and other hedge instruments, export restrictions, various 
forms of food reserves, and trade and export promotion. 
 Investment policies e.g. multilateral trade and bilateral investment agreements, foreign invest-
ment legislation and agreements including fiscal incentives, concessional finance, investor 
protection and stabilisation clauses (“regulatory chill”), with biofuels and biotech technolo-
gies demanding special regulatory attention. 
This is not the place for a detailed examination of these instruments and their interaction and respec-
tive food security impact. However, it goes without saying that each of these instruments can play an 
important role and, therefore, any proposal for improvements must take into account the present regu-
latory framework and the dynamic interactions between the different tools. 
                                                 
* This is a slightly edited version of a report from a 2 days visit to Addis Ababa on the subject of Ethiopian food 
reserve policies and practice (26+27 November 2012). Numerous documents, recent literature studies and further 
discussions completed my field research which, however, must remain fragmentary and possibly fraught with 
errors, as is to be expected for any short-time visitor. As I will continue research in this field, comments remain 
welcome. 
1 The entitlement approach concentrates on each person’s entitlements to commodity bundles including food, 
and views starvation as resulting from a failure to be entitled to any bundle with enough food. For a detailed 
description see UNDP (2010). 
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3. Regional initiatives for agricultural trade and investment 
The advantages of more regional integration have been recognised at the highest political level (AU, 
ECA, others). The AU Joint Conference of African Ministers of Agriculture and Ministers of Trade in 
Addis Ababa held from 29-31 November 2012 reconfirmed the need to boost intra-African trade and 
investment as a “key to agricultural transformation and ensuring food and nutrition security”, in par-
ticular by improving and supporting initiatives fostering private sector development.2 Concerted ef-
forts for regional trade and investment have been undertaken in at least three areas relating to food 
security. 
 Agricultural and food reserve policies: on 16 April 2010 the Second African Ministerial Confer-
ence on Disaster Risk Reduction adopted an “Extended Programme of Action for the implementa-
tion of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006-2015)”3. After the East Af-
rican drought in 2010, a document entitled “Emergency in the Horn of Africa” the FAO, IFAD 
and WFP advocated “cash for work, non-conditional cash transfers and vouchers-for-work”.4 In 
West Africa, a “regional agricultural policy” also addressing food security is emerging; however, 
at this stage, it looks more like a replica of national policies and declarations of intent.5 Beyond 
that level and apart from preliminary studies and discussions for the proposed West African Food 
Reserve, no concrete action seems to have been undertaken except of course at the national level.6 
The only regional model presently available as a blueprint is the (not yet operational) ASEAN Plus 
Three Emergency Rice Reserve Agreement (APTERR) signed on 7 October 2011 in Jakarta (Indo-
nesia).7 There are no comparable plans for the Horn of Africa, and the COMESA Regional In-
vestment Agency (RIA) has not yet extended its services to regional food projects (COME-
SA/RIA, 2012). Interestingly, ECOWAS is apparently trying to emulate this regional food security 
agreement (UNCTAD 2011, and ICTSD 2011). 
 Despite the recentness of the so-called ‘land grab’ phenomenon, numerous attempts to better reg-
ulate agricultural land use have already been undertaken at a regional level. For instance, the 
ECA-based African Land Policy Initiative (LPI) has recognised inter alia that small and medium 
scale enterprises create more jobs per invested dollar.8 There is a Framework to Strengthen Land 
                                                 
2 See the Concept Note for the conference at 
http://au.int/en/dp/rea/sites/default/files/Concept%20Note%20of%20AU%20Joint%20Conference%20of%20Mi
nisters%20of%20Agriculture%20and%20Ministers%20of%20Trade%20-%20Final.pdf accessed on 10 Decem-
ber 2012. 
3 Cf. 
http://au.int/en/dp/rea/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%20Second%20Ministerial%20Conference%20on
%20DRR%20Nairobi.pdf accessed on 10 December 2012 (see Annex II). 
4 See http://au.int/en/dp/rea/sites/default/files/AU%20-%20Emergency%20in%20HoA_August2011.pdf, ac-
cessed on 10 December 2012. This text also recalls the “Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Plan of Ac-
tion for the Horn of Africa including the development of functional strategic food reserves that can buffer the 
shock of acute food shortages and the avoidance of large-scale food crises.” For Ethiopia, cf. IBRD 2011 “grad-
uation [out of poverty and PSNP] is a long term goal requiring long term resources.” (p.34). See also FAO 
(2012) p.38. 
5 See, for instance, CEDEAO (2009) (in French). 
6 Ghana, for example, is setting up a National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO) which is to provide a 
“minimum guaranteed price and ready market” for Ghanaian staple food farmers, with farm gate prices deter-
mined by the post harvest committee. Whether the objective is farmgate price support or consumer price stabili-
sation is unclear: http://mofa.gov.gh/site/?page_id=705 (information dated 2011; accessed 07/12/12) 
7 Cf. http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/11th-amaf-plus-three-countries-conclude-
agreement-on-rice (draft agreement available on file), and Trethewie (2013). 
8 Main website maintained at ECA, accessed 10 December 2012 at http://new.uneca.org/lpi/home_lpi.aspx, re-
ports that the Eighth African Development Forum (ADFVIII) recommended “equity, improved skills, domestica-
tion of policies and attention to small investors” as the main components of the LPI (ECA Press Release 
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Rights, Enhance Productivity and Secure Livelihoods as part of the LPI (AU, AfDB, ECA). Also, 
the Virtual African Land Policy and Administration Facility (VALPAF) is yet to become opera-
tional.9 In July 2011, the Committee on Rural Economy, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Envi-
ronment of the Pan African Parliament Committee called for a “moratorium on new large-scale 
land acquisitions pending implementation of land policies and guidelines on good land govern-
ance”.10 Furthermore, the Nairobi Action Plan to Promote Land-Based Investments that Benefit 
Africa which was adopted in October 2011, advocated “a monitoring and reporting mechanism for 
tracking large-scale land based investments with a view to ensuring that these ventures are benefi-
cial to national economic development and local communities.”11 There are many more statements 
on political governance for agricultural land use, plans for a peer review mechanism, and a pro-
gramme for more concrete development studies. However, for the time being, decisions on policy 
reform and in respect of structural adjustments remain a national responsibility. 
 The African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) was set up on 30 April 2008 in the sovereign debt 
context by the African Development Bank (AfDB) as a pre-judiciary instrument to address the 
“growing problem of vulture funds”. It is also supposed to serve as an instrument “especially in 
the Natural Resources Sector” but, again, only if and when it is called upon and allowed to work at 
the national level.12 No ALSF activities have been reported for Ethiopia. 
All these regional initiatives certainly go into the right direction. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the 
attempts to build a regional perspective into the food security conundrum are yet to produce tangible 
results in Ethiopia. 
For the time being and as far as Ethiopia is concerned, the old vision of “Black Gold for Blue Gold” 
combining the oil and the water potential of Sudan and Ethiopia – or even the whole Horn of Africa – 
remains a far-fetched vision (Verhoefen 2011). For its food security, Ethiopia still has to rely on its 
own natural and human resources and policies – and on the goodwill of its international donors. 
4. Ethiopian food security policies 
Despite the fact that it is one of Africa’s largest grain producers (USDA 2012) and has Africa’s high-
est livestock population (Haile, p.28), Ethiopia has been food-insecure for decades. Data vary accord-
ing to definitions and agencies, with the official figure of food-insecure people presently standing at 
over 7 million, the biggest number in Sub-Saharan Africa; another 40 million are considered as “recur-
rently hungry”.13 The main emergency food reserve EFSR has disbursed food aid in each year between 
1994 and 2011, in a range from 80’000mt (1996) to 1 Million mt (2003). As will be shown below not 
all uses were made for emergency reasons; moreover, high levels of disbursements and production 
shortfalls did hardly ever correlate. 
Policy coordination takes places under the lead of the MoA, in coordination with a large number of 
agencies from the same and from other ministries. On top of the hierarchy is the Disaster Risk Man-
                                                                                                                                                        
177/2012 at http://new.uneca.org/ArticleDetail/tabid/3018/ArticleId/2208/ADF-VIII-recommends-equity-
improved-skills-domestication-of-policies-and-attention-to-small-investors.aspx). 
9 Cf. Decision A/DEC/01/05 (in French) and Annex dated January 2005 accessed on 12 December 2012 at 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/index.php?id=p_p1_commission&lang=en 
10 See http://new.uneca.org/Portals/lpi/Documents/Recommendation-Committee-on-agriculture.pdf accessed on 
10 December 2012. 
11 See http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/nairobi-action-plan-to-promote-land-based-investments-
that-benefit-africa-8421/ accessed on 10 December 2012. 
12 For areas of present ALSF intervention see http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-
partnerships/african-legal-support-facility/areas-of-intervention/ accessed at 10 December 2012. 
13 Source: Interview with Mr. Mathewos Hunde (DRMFSS, 27 November 2012). 
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agement and Food Security Sector, also acting as an early warning and response directory. It records 
production and consumption data, and availability of food reserves, including stocks and supplies from 
other than the MoA-controlled food reserves. All relevant agencies are represented in the DRMFSS,14 
including the Health Ministry, the National Meteorological Agency,15 and the Central Statistical 
Agency. It also conducts multi-agency needs assessments with the help of a working group called 
ENCU.16 In case of insufficiency of domestic resources it can appeal to the international community. 
a. Six food security measures 
Remindful of the past decades with several years of massive famine and political upheavals, the Gov-
ernment of Ethiopia is focusing its efforts in three ways: on food production, food aid, and price stabi-
lisation. Two more instruments have been set up by private operators: different production insurance 
schemes and the Commodity exchange have attracted international attention and are now part of the 
Ethiopian food security equation. The last instrument, production credit, so far remains embryonic, 
and limited to a few pilot schemes. The donor community supports all six sets of measures in various 
ways. 
1. In order to increase local food production, the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) has 
been set up with the explicit and ambitious mandate to modernise Ethiopian agriculture. Ex-
amples of measures so far taken include reversal of soil depletion (EthioSIS/ISFM), fertiliser 
production and use optimisation (fertiliser-blended facilities), productivity promotion pro-
grammes for the basic staple cereal teff (said to reach as of next year 500’000 farmers)17, pilot 
credit schemes, biotech studies18 and farmer’s (re-)organisation.19 
2. Emergency situations (and chronic hunger) are addressed by various measures, in particular by 
the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) which has formed the backbone of safety net ac-
tivities in Ethiopia (IBRD 2011, p.33).20 It is a disaster risk early warning and management 
programme, operating through cash for work by the government together with the donor 
community.21 The PSNP also claims a positive impact on agricultural productivity.22 The main 
PSNP instrument is the EFSR which will be described below. 
                                                 
14 http://www.dppc.gov.et/  
15 Main tasks in respect of food security: present assessments (future) and field assessments (crop performance) 
in 11 branch offices supporting statistics; improve current knowledge; develop weather-based index together 
with insurance companies; support water resource: availability forecast for dams, releases and stops; forecasts 
during planting, harvesting; climate change mitigation: what kind of plants (depending on duration of the rainy 
seasons). Forecasts are said to be 80% reliable. 
16 The “Joint Government and Humanitarian Partners’ Document” dated August 2012, establishes for the period 
August to December 2012 “total net humanitarian requirements” of $189’433’303 (or 193’866mt for food only, 
costing around $149’276’820). 
17 Teff is gluten-free (and lactose-free) and yet protein-rich. Applications for various target groups in developed 
countries are being studied. Cf. http://www.mercur.org/?p=6395&l=0 (in German), accessed 14 December 2012. 
18 According to ATA, the Africa Biotechnology Network Association came to Addis Ababa in December 2012 
for a study on the use of biotech applications in Ethiopia, the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol and 
national regulation (as a part of a US$ 5m grant from USAID and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, com-
mitted for Ethiopia). 
19 ATA: “We prepare a strategy to revamp 47 coop unions, then their primary societies in order to bring govern-
ance capacity, administration and financing. Open space for private farmers’ associations incl. coops, very close 
cooperation with Government in order to establish a cooperatives’ college aided by Coop College (London). The 
new PM insists on farmer union audits (as a condition to give dividends to members). Now they actually start 
doing the audits!” 
20 Cf. Government of Ethiopia (2006, 2007, and 2009). 
21 Direct support in cooperation with DRMFSS, JEOP and WFP (for Somali region). Plans to replace food aid 
with cash and vouchers. Cf. IFPRI (2011), a complete study on Food for Work Programmes but without any 
indication of price depression. 
22 FAO (2012) reports that “participation in the PSNP and the Household Asset Building Programme raised the 
likelihood of using fertilizer by 19.5 percentage points” (p.43). 
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3. Price stabilisation: according to widely held beliefs, albeit with little evidence,23 the “middle-
men” are to blame for both the ever increasing food prices and for the fact that farm gate pric-
es remain below world market levels. As a consequence, price stabilisation measures by way 
of governmental cereal supplies to millers and bakers enjoy high general support.24 The EGTE 
described below is the main driver of this policy, but there is no information available on in-
tervention criteria, triggers, and quantities. More on this later. 
4. The new Commodity Exchange (ECX) is the first of its kind in Sub-Saharan Africa. It had 
been hailed as a big step forward in the fight for transparency and against market power abuse 
by the “middlemen”. Now the farmers25 can bring their crops to one of the 17 warehouses es-
tablished by the ECX in the growing regions, agree with the manager on the quality grading 
and give him their minimum offering price which they can modify after each trading day and 
for one month (after which there is a penalty). Today ECX handles over 60% of Ethiopian cof-
fee (different schemes, some export directly, or through coops, with a primary market around 
the warehouse through local traders). The commission is 0.04% of the transaction value. Trad-
ing is by ‘open cry’ and the farmer can see all the paid prices on his cell phone.26 Yet there is 
no price risk hedging.27 At this point in time and to the disappointment of a number of people 
who had hoped for more, only contracts for three export crops are traded on this spot market: 
coffee, sesame, and white beans. Nevertheless, according to studies undertaken by ECX (una-
vailable to me), farmers now obtain on average 65% of the traded price whereas their share 
was only 35% before its establishment. 
5. Production insurance operated inter alia by Nyala Insurance Company, in cooperation with 
WFP, Oxfam America, and others.28 Its micro-insurance department is still in a pilot stage. It 
started in 2006 with 120 farmers/261ha for wheat, teff, and haricot beans; in 2008 there were 
827 farmers/778ha, with additional farmers and surfaces joining/insured in 2010. Farmers un-
able to pay the insurance premium can nevertheless obtain an insurance license through “work 
for insurance” at a “work for food” project operated by Oxfam or USAID, for instance for en-
vironmental protection, forest, or compost.29 After an initial trial and error period with more 
specific risks insured30, its operation has become much simpler, because compensation is now 
                                                 
23 An example given to me was for bananas, a non-exported good. Farmers used to get 1 Birr/kg and protested 
when they found it cost 5 Birr in town. Subsequently the farmgate price apparently doubled to 2 Birr – but in 
Addis bananas now cost 10 Birr! 
24 Sabate-Wheeler and Devereux note that “Most of these mechanisms were abolished under agricultural liberali-
sation reforms during the 1980s and 1990s, but an argument could be made to retain or revive some of their 
positive food security features.” (p.15) 
25 Ethiopia has 12-15m almost exclusively small farmers. 
26 Appeal is possible, with third party ruling. Ethiopian not global standards (International reference market, bulk 
issue), sold to processors, finalise, exporters. Producers sell spot/immediate delivery, to exporters with forward 
contracts. Partner banks with deposit accounts, warehouse can pay immediately. Buyers with forward contracts 
get finance, guarantees. 
27 An online trading system is being prepared for all market participants to intervene during the sessions. Moreo-
ver there are plans for futures trading under review by the regulatory authority. 
28 The Ethiopia Drought Insurance Pilot Project of the WFP and the IBRD is supported by the LEAP food secu-
rity early warning tool which converts agro-meteorological data into crop or rangeland production estimates and 
allows quantifying the financial resources needed to scale up the National Productive Safety Net Programme (cf. 
WFP/LEAP 2012). For this project, WFP writes that it obtained insurance through a contract with AXA Re, a 
Paris-based re-insurer using a sophisticated index based on Ethiopia’s historical rainfall and agricultural output. 
Cf. http://www.hoefsloot.com/en/leap-for-ethiopia, and http://www.wfp.org/disaster-risk-reduction/leap both 
accessed on 10 December 2012, whereas Oxfam America (2011) considers that the HARITA project “comple-
ments disaster risk reduction and long-term, sustainable investments in agriculture”. 
29 This particular scheme started in 2009 in the Tigray Region. 
30 Multiperil insurance (+ lifestock insurance for commercial farms). Risks: frost, excessive rainfall, drought, 
fire/lightning, hail. depending on local situation. Meteo classes insufficient info for risk calculation: on-farm 
assessment during harvest, calculate yield shortfall. Mostly small farmers up to 1ha, scattered: double trigger (i) 
occurrence reported by nearby weather station (ii) sample farmers, with local agents/NGO. Base risk plus local 
risk. Other options are premium-pooling and different time serials (presently 3,3 and 5 years). 
Ethiopia’s Food Reserve Policies and Practice 
 7
triggered by a weather-based index.31 In the week before my arrival, compensation of 19’000 
farmers was announced at a press conference. Reinsurance for this scheme is guaranteed by 
the Switzerland-based reinsurance company Swiss Re.32 While it is too early to consider the 
scheme as a commercial success with a demonstrable impact on farmers’ income stabilisation, 
it is clearly a step in the right direction.33 At the same time it should be recognised that the 
scheme covers certain production risks only and, in particular, does not help farmers to gauge 
and hedge commercial risks such as price fluctuations, or longer-term investment risks. This, 
incidentally, is just one of the problems accelerating the “land rush” of foreign-based investors 
benefitting from such insurance (and legal protection). Other problems presently limiting the 
usefulness of the initial yield-based insurance schemes, especially communication and organi-
sational mistakes, have been pointed out by an evaluation report conducted by Terefe Degefa 
for Nyala Insurance in May 2010 (p.70); Getaw Tadesse from IFPRI considers that insurance 
may not work for risk-adverse farmers. In addition, crop insurance is easier to handle than 
livestock insurance because the latter has a much longer production cycle especially for im-
proved breeds.34 
6. For a long time, production credits have been available, if at all, for commercial farmers only. 
More recently, micro-credit schemes have sprung up mainly by way of private initiatives, 
while the government and its own financial institutions mostly remained passive. Availability 
is still severely limited, and the pilot schemes now in operation only cover crop production 
and do not extend to marketing or to other price risks. A number of serious constraints to a de-
velopment of credit schemes on a comprehensive basis and available to small farmers have re-
cently been analysed by Ali and Deininger (IBRD 2012).35 It has also been pointed out to me 
that the credit challenge is different in the lowlands with more property rights both for nomads 
and agriculturalists than in the more secure highlands with more government involvement and 
different land tenure policies for crop farmers. In Ethiopia, highland agriculture is mostly crop 
production, with 1-2 cows per farm and communal and protected grazing even for sedentary 
farmers. On the other side, lowland farming is mostly nomadic and depends more on live-
stock, with more uncertain tenure, more severely depleted water resources, and heavy over-
grazing. This vicious circle which economists call the “tragedy of the commons” is principally 
due to land state ownership; but even here solutions exist, as has been shown for community 
forest management.36 The fact that all land belongs to the State is probably a major problem as 
long as a bank cannot use farmland for collateral. At any rate, without a successful develop-
ment of a credit system responding to small farmers’ needs for production and investment 
                                                 
31 Since 2009 pure weather-index insurance operated in 3 regions. Satellite data from Columbia Universi-
ty/IFPRI/WFP/FAO/Oxfam America. “Automatic” (effective area rainfall) compensation 2012 paid to 19’000 
insured farmers with drought damage. Also with Africa Insurance Company and Oromia Insurance, in 38 villag-
es. Cheaper premia, good for small farmers. Despite reinsurance (Swiss Re) this is still a loss operation. There is 
no price risk insurance, only crop and livestock loss due to climate. But Nyala shareholders are from rural areas, 
and they are CSR-minded. The scheme will be profitable although only in the “very long term”. 
32 Swiss Re (2010). Other countries with similar insurance schemes and Swiss Re participation include Rwanda 
(http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr_20121011_micro_rwanda.html), Senegal 
(http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr_20110920_CGI_Commitments.html) and Vietnam 
(http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/Vietnams_rice_farmers_to_get_loss_protection.html); infor-
mation accessed on 14 December 2012. 
33 According to Nyala Insurance and others, future developments could be premia subsidies by the government, 
or a recently design by the National Bank of a legal framework (tax free). Meteo availability (time series) and 
quality are said to remain problematic. Training needs in “financial literacy”. A big project seems to be contem-
plated, with lots of support, interlink (input) credit with insurance. 
34 There is a pilot scheme by ILRI for livestock insurance (Ethiopia and Kenya), with Oromia Insurance: basic 
risks, average productivity, weather, average community loss. 
35 “The removal of credit constraints is estimated to increase productivity by 11.4 percentage points” (but “crop 
productivity is estimated to be unaffected by credit constraints in a more drought-prone and food insecure zone 
where loans are used for purposes, mainly purchase of livestock, other than crop production.”) 
36 According to the economist Garrett Hardin (1968), this is the depletion of a shared resource by individuals, 
acting independently and rationally according to each one's self-interest, despite their understanding that deplet-
ing the common resource is contrary to their long-term best interests). [Quoted from Wikipedia] 
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domestic production will not be able to take off – and climate change adaptation will be the 
more difficult (Di Falco et al, p.841). This might even prevent credit schemes for soil conser-
vation and other measures to improve resilience especially during the most important rainfall 
season, Meher), two examples where proper management can solve the collateral issue. 
One cannot fail to be impressed by such comprehensive and generally well-structured and coordinated 
action. Ethiopian food security policies today are based on a courageous and all-out approach, but also 
an expensive one which depends to a large extent on foreign aid. Of course, almost inevitably and 
despite considerable efforts of coordination, there are overlaps, and there is competition even though 
there is little room for non-governmental intervention. 
Fortunately, the problem of aid (over-)dependence seems to have been recognised, and different solu-
tions have been advocated by several contacts: to reduce eligible beneficiaries in order to focus on 
social food security policies (GTP), to reduce in-kind food aid and move instead to cash aid and/or to 
provide vouchers for a limited number of staple items at least in the non-remote areas of the country 
on the basis of a cost and nutrition analysis, and to provide financial education for extension workers 
and farmers. 
More importantly, however, it appears that some of these instruments are impairing the positive im-
pact or even defeating objectives of others. Perhaps the most problematic aspect here is the present use 
of the food reserve schemes which is described in the next section. 
b. The food reserve system 
A variety of off-farm food reserve schemes exists in Ethiopia, and they follow different objectives. 
The main instrument is the Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR). With a food stock of 
410’000mt (mainly wheat, maize and sorghum) the EFSR is the biggest physical food stockpile in the 
country, with storage sites located in 7 different food insecurity-prone areas. It was set up in 1972 after 
a very big famine, and it was reorganised in 1982 and 1992, before receiving its present status in 2008 
as a relatively independent entity under the ambit of the Ministry of Agriculture. According to publicly 
known but unverifiable information the EFSR is to be increased to a total quantity of 3 Million mt of 
government-owned food and non-food37 items by the end of the present Growth and Transformation 
Period, i.e. 2015/16. 
According to its Managing Director, EFSR works very well, with a technically very simple scheme. In 
case of an emergency the EFSR immediately releases the required quantities on the basis of a formal 
promissory note by an eligible donor agency38 to replace this quantity within an agreed period of 
time.39 An equivalent volume of food commodities is then being shipped to Ethiopia, and handed over 
to EFSR. In this way the overall quantities remain the same over time – and their quality remains good 
by such a frequent rotation. Moreover, the costs of this scheme to the government are limited because 
the borrower has to cover all handling and distribution costs.40 
                                                 
37 Plastic sheet for shelter, blankets, water bladders, individual water containers, water purification units, genera-
tors and rub-hall tents. 
38 Current donors are, essentially, CIDA, USAID, EU, WFP, and Catholic Relief Services, also represented in 
the Technical Committee. 
39 The fund manager can release up to 5’000mt, the Technical Committee up to 30’000mt and the Board Chair-
man up to 50’000mt, provided the stock at hand is above 25% of the total reserve. 
40 I have tried to collect information on real storage costs. It appears that (private) storage cost is very difficult to 
calculate, depending on the size of warehouses, credit availability for capital and running costs. In 1998, Tedesse 
and Guttormsen found a specific cost of 54 Birr per ton per month for storage loss, rent, fumigation, capital cost 
of private, small warehouses (p.89). The IFPRI study says $35.40 (14 years later but 7 higher!) vs $44.30 in 
Bangladesh, India $60. The EU estimated the costs to be $25/mt/year (not counting labour paid by users, only 
permanent labour/infrastructure, plus preservation cost paid by Gvt, about 10m Birr/yr) 
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The more recent arrival on the market of EGTE41 as a borrower of EFSR stocks in order to stabilise 
market prices e.g. for bread, has changed the nature and objectives of EFSR. In fact, EGTE buys main-
ly wheat on the world market (with some purchases from local farmers e.g. for pasta flour production). 
If it estimates that bread prices are too high, it can sell wheat at reduced prices to millers and bakers in 
order to get the bread prices down. If urgent action is required it borrows the necessary quantities from 
the EFSR. The losses incurred by the government (and the National Bank) in these operations are con-
siderable.42 This also shows that, while school feeding or “food for work” programmes (which are also 
EFRS-eligible) might serve a social policy purpose similar to emergency food aid, as long as it focuses 
on the most food-insecure population, this is not the case for these EGTE operations which benefit the 
whole non-farming population regardless of income. Besides, the import quantities are also decreed by 
the government, based on EGTE’s estimate of supply and demand. 
Even more importantly it appears that food price stabilisation by EGTE and EFSR has a price-
depressing effect for domestic producers. As shown by the below table, food aid deliveries often took 
place during good harvests, thus actually reinforcing farmgate price depression. 
                                                 
41 EGTE’s main task is to create a market for commercial producers (and small farmers), including for exports. It 
owns warehouses with a total capacity of 800’000mt. Secondly, EGTE is to stabilise staple food markets. Prices 
are fixed by government decree for EGTE’s stocks, as well as for sale to target users (flour and bread factories, 
household consumers). However, no information was available on the intervention prices and triggers for the 
market releases operated directly by the EGTE or by EFSR. 
42 A price example quoted to me in order to explain why private traders do not import wheat even though they 
theoretically could get a licence mentioned a CIF-world market price of currently 800 Birr per quintal against a 
local wholesale price of presently 500 Birr. 
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Production and food aid in Ethiopia, 1996-2008 (IFPRI 2011, p.2) 
Year  Total Grain Pro-
duction 
Total Food Aid 
Deliveries 
Food Aid as % of 
Production 
Production per 
Capita  
                                     ('000mt)                      ('000mt)  
1996  10,327.9     244    2.4  0.18  
1997  10,436.8     228    2.2  0.18  
1998    8,102.7     444    5.5  0.14  
1999    8,866.9     473    5.3  0.15  
2000    9,233.6  1,231  13.3  0.15  
2001  11,039.2     980    8.9  0.17  
2002  10,371.4     266    2.6  0.16  
2003  11,536.3  1,887  16.4  0.17  
2004  10,626.9     732    6.9  0.15  
2005  12,573.9  1,004    8.0  0.17  
2006  14,411.6     552    3.8  0.19  
2007  15,572.5     285    1.8  0.20  
2008  16,871.9     626    3.7  0.22  
For example, Tadesse and Shively argue that “a 1% increase in annual per capita food aid reduces 
monthly prices by as much as 5%” (p.2). The extent of this negative impact on farm income may vary, 
and it can be mitigated by limited recourse to reserve use and better timing to food emergencies. As 
will be shown below, certain food stock management principles and practices may also help. 
5. A study to improve the food reserve system in Ethiopia 
Food reserves, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, have come to stay as an instrument for more food security, 
and they are likely to increase over time. Although many studies and data are now available which 
show the shortcomings of the present system, there is no assessment of the situation with a view to 
future developments, including climate change and demography, beyond the range of directly con-
cerned parameters such as production, trade, and investments. What is also lacking is the international 
regulatory framework and ongoing negotiations in the WTO and other fora regarding agricultural bor-
der protection and subsidies, including new disciplines on national food reserves, international food 
aid, and export taxes and restrictions. 
Any proposal for improvements of Ethiopian food reserves as one form of off-farm “food savings” 
schemes should therefore be based on a comprehensive food security risk analysis taking into account 
not only the present and foreseeable future production, consumption, trade and investment needs in a 
given country.43 Besides good management practices, cost is a key factor – especially in view of the 
intention to increase the EFSR from half a million to 3 million metric tons. Obviously depending on 
their precise (and sometimes multiple) objectives, there is a wide gamut of different possibilities to 
manage and to finance the costs which can be borne by the government (taxes or levies), foreign do-
nors44, importers, or directly by consumers. 
Incidentally, the case of Switzerland and its compulsory food stockpile system might serve as an ex-
ample: the Government decides how large each commodity stock needs to be (generally 3 - 4 months 
of consumption requirements for the whole population, for sugar, rice, edible oils and fats, coffee, and 
cereals); it periodically inspects the stocks, guarantees credits, and authorises market releases (only) in 
case of supply disruptions outside the control of normal trade. All food importers are organised in a 
stock management organisation called “réservesuisse” which owns the stocks and is responsible for 
                                                 
43 For instance, the export restrictions for cereals imposed by Ethiopia as a response to the food crisis of 2008 is 
a WTO accession issue which needs to be addressed in a long-term food security strategy (Hailu, p.36). 
44 The United States of America is Ethiopia’s largest bilateral donor today, allocating close to $800 million in 
FY2011 ($570 million plus emergency food aid funding). Source: CGD 2012. The worldwide reduction of food 
aid, mostly and cynically coming as a result of increasing world market prices, is a challenge for food reserve 
financing even for the special case of Ethiopia. 
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the warehouse construction, food storage, and rotation. The costs are fully financed by an import 
levy.45 In effect this means that food security in Switzerland, first, is efficient and cheap, and second, 
that it is paid by the consumer and comes free of cost for the state. 
Food reserves as a tool for food security must be analysed together with other instruments, including 
the rapidly evolving risk management tools available to food producers and processors such as insur-
ance, commodity exchanges, future trading and other hedge instruments, and investment and produc-
tion credits. Finally, it is clear that a credible proposal must also take into account foreseeable devel-
opments in the international field such as overall food production, trade and consumption patterns, 
climate change, and the above-mentioned evolving regulatory framework for trade and investment in 
food. 
The study proposed here would need to be undertaken in close cooperation with all involved stake-
holders. It could address the following questions and options, based on a SWOT analysis of the pre-
sent system in the national and international context described above: 
1. How can the Ethiopian system of food reserves be improved: 
a. Separate social policies and food price stabilisation (food aid only for people without 
resources to produce or buy their food; price stabilisation only in periods of external 
shocks and market disruptions)? 
b. Separate reserves and schemes according to objectives (food aid, food for work, price 
stabilisation)?  
c. Improve relationship with other food security policies and instruments? 
d. How to reduce or to avoid price depression for Ethiopian farmers? 
e. Envisage regional (Horn of Africa? COMESA?) and/or virtual food reserves? 
f. Reduce costs by entrusting some reserves to producers, or private traders? 
2. Pros and cons of alternative measures 
a. Trade liberalisation 
b. Investment liberalisation (within the present regulatory framework re land ownership 
and land use, but with new guidelines for agricultural FDI, mandatory food security 
impact assessments, and monitoring) 
c. Social policies including food stamps for the needy 
d. Land reform (long-term leases with performance monitoring) 
3. Recommendations for various stakeholders 
The formulation of a research project will depend on the interest generated by this report for various 
stakeholders, the ambitions for smaller or bigger reforms, and on available human and financial re-
sources. A detailed study proposal can be prepared within 3 months after receipt of a concrete request. 
Implementation in cooperation with one or more local researchers (and their staff for field work) could 
then start within 3 months of agreement and, depending on the extent of necessary field research, be 
completed over a period of 6-12 months, starting in the second half of 2013. 
Christian Häberli 
                                                 
45 Source: http://www.reservesuisse.ch/index.php?L=1, and for general information about the National Economic 
Supply Policy: http://www.bwl.admin.ch/index.html?lang=en. 
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Attachments 
1. List of Contacts 
Addis Ababa University, Faculty of Law Mekete Bekele Tekle, Assistant Professor of Law 
Martha Belete Hailu, Assistant Professor of Law 
ATA Marco Quinones, PhD, Senior Director Implementation 
Pascal Joannes, Director, Value Chains Wheat, Maize and Barley 
DRMFSS Mathewos Hunde, Director, Early Warning & Response Directorate 
ECA / Commission économique pour 
l’Afrique (Addis Ababa) 
Josué Dioné, Directeur, Division de Développement Durable 
(DDD) 
Adama Ekberg Coulibaly, Chief, Agricultural Production Systems 
Section (FSDDD) 
ECX Abenet Bekele, Chief Strategy Officer 
EFSRA Sirak Hailu, Director General 
EGTE Berhane Hailu, General Manager 
Elfora Farm, Hawassa Mr. Mulaty, Operations Director 
Hawassa University, School of Law Shiferaw Kebede, Director 
IFPRI Eastern and Southern Africa Re-
gional Office (Addis Ababa) 
Getaw Tadesse, Postdoctoral Fellow 
National Meteorological Agency Dula Shanko, Deputy Director General 
Nyala Insurance S.C. Biniam Taddese, Senior Analyst Corporate Planning 
Oxfam America (Addis Ababa) Munaye Tesfaye Makonnen, Microinsurance Program Officer 
SDC Addis Ababa Office Manuel Flury, Director of Cooperation 
Senait Regassa, National Programme Officer 
UNCTAD Division on Africa, 
Least developed Countries and Special 
Programmes (Geneva) 
Taffere Tesfachew, Director 
WFP Country Office Eric Branckaert, Head of Vulnerability Analysis & Mapping Unit 
2. List of Acronyms 
ATA Agricultural Transformation Agency 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
DRMFSS Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (http://www.dppc.gov.et/) 
ECA Economic Commission for Africa (here also quoted as CEA, Comm. Éco. pour l’Afrique) 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States (here also quoted as CEDEAO / Communauté 
économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) 
ECX Ethiopia Commodity Exchange 
EFSRA Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration 
EGTE Ethiopian Grain / Coffee Trade Enterprise 
ENCU Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (in DRMFSS) 
EthioSIS Ethiopian Soil Information Service 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
ha hectares 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) 
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute 
ISFM Integrated Soil Fertility Management 
MoA Ministry of Agriculture 
mt metric tons 
NDPPC National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee 
PSNP Productive Safety Net Program 
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
SWOT Analysis of a strategy’s Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
WFP World Food Programme 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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